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Abstract 
 
This study explores to what extent the Islamic financing instruments are used by non-financial 
firms. Based on a panel data of firms from fourteen developing countries for the 2005-2009 
period, we find that Islamic financing forms a significant share of the users’ capital structures. 
Less profitable firms are found more likely to use debt than equity in which case Islamic 
instruments were preferred over conventional debt. The finding suggests that Islamic financing 
does benefit less profitable firms, which is consistent with the agency cost perspective. 
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1. Introduction 
Research about corporate financing has flourished since the infamous proposition of 
capital structure irrelevance by Modigliani and Miller (1958). Significant progress has been 
made to understand the determinants of financing choice, which has resulted in voluminous 
empirical evidence that tested various capital structure theories such as agency theory (Jensen, 
1986), trade-off theory and pecking order theory (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). In essence, 
the theories attempted to explain factors that could plausibly influence the use of internal funds 
(i.e., profits) and external funds (i.e., debt and equity) in corporate financing.  
However, our understanding of corporate financing decisions remains incomplete, 
particularly in respect of the use of Islamic financing instruments (referred to as IFIs hereafter). 
There is a clear gap in the corporate finance literature because it is currently unable to explain 
the economic rationale of why firms use IFIs to finance their activities. This gap has to be 
addressed given the fact that Islamic finance industry remains buoyant even during the recent 
economic slowdown.1 Our study aims to fill this gap. We conjecture that religion is not the sole 
factor that influences the decision to use IFIs in corporate financing. We offer plausible 
economic rationale for this financing behaviour. The insight offered in this study provides an 
important foundation for future research on corporate financing. 
Theoretically, due to the prohibition of interest on debt and promotion of profit and loss 
sharing, IFIs should possess attributes that are distinguishable from conventional financing 
instruments (Ayub, 2007). The distinctive nature of Islamic financing invokes a question on 
whether the decision to use IFIs will be influenced by similar set of factors that influence the 
use of conventional instruments. To answer this question, we test whether the usual firm-
specific factors, namely, profitability, growth opportunities, collateral, size and liquidity 
influence the use of IFIs by firms.  
                                                 
1 Financial Times (12 May 2011).  
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First, we find that Islamic financing forms a significant proportion of users’ capital 
structures. Second, less profitable firms and those with greater growth opportunities are 
associated with greater use of debt as measured by leverage (i.e., long-term debt over equity), 
which is consistent with the pecking order theory. This suggests that, firms attract debt over 
equity due to greater asymmetric information as proxied by growth opportunities and the 
shortage of internal funds’ (i.e., profitability). Thirdly, profitability is significantly related to 
the decision to use Islamic financing, in which less profitable firms have more proportion of 
IFIs instead of conventional debt in their capital structures. Islamic financing attracts less 
profitable firms due to the presence of adverse selection amongst Islamic financiers, who may 
discount the agency cost of financing to survive within their restricted investment universe 
(Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Godlewski et al., 2013).  
 
2. Sample and Data 
The sample is consisted of large firms from fourteen developing countries that have 
non-negligible presence of Islamic banks: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Malaysia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates 
and Palestine. The corporate firms in these countries may have greater incentives to use Islamic 
financing due to the ready demand to invest in IFIs created by the Islamic financiers there. The 
data on IFIs were gathered from the annual reports of the firms for the period 2005-2009. The 
firms were constituents of the top twenty list of the main stock market index of each country. 
The sample excludes financial firms. 
As reported in Table 1, annual reports were available for 129 firms. IFIs were used by 
firms in fifty seven percent (i.e., 8/14) of the sample countries, namely, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, 
UAE, Pakistan, Indonesia, Qatar, Kuwait and Egypt.  
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------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
  
Firms’ preference of using debt over equity to finance their operations is measured by 
the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to total equity (de Jong et al., 2008). This leverage 
ratio is set as the dependent variable when testing the influence of firm-specific factors on the 
preference to use debt over equity. To study the determinants of Islamic financing among firms, 
the ratio of long-term IFIs to long-term debt is used as the dependent variable. This ratio reflects 
the extent of firms’ preference of using IFIs over conventional debt to finance their operations. 
Profitability is measured as the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortisation divided by the total assets (Bevan and Danbolt, 2004). The firm’s market-to-book 
ratio is a common variable used to proxy for growth opportunities. It is defined as the ratio of 
the firm’s market value of equity to the book value of equity. It contains the highest information 
content with respect to investment opportunities (Adam and Goyal, 2008). Tangibility is 
defined as the ratio of tangible fixed assets (net of accumulated depreciation) to the firm’s book 
value of total assets. It measures the firm’s collateral level. Liquidity is simply the firm’s 
current ratio which is measured as the current assets divided by the current liabilities. Firm size 
is measured as the natural log of total sales.  
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study are presented in Table 2. 
As reported in Table 2, the average leverage (i.e., long-term debt over equity) of firms is 85%, 
which is surprisingly high. By comparison, the average presence of IFIs on the firms’ capital 
structure is substantial, which is 28% of their total equity. The average ratio of IFIs to total 
debt is even higher, which is 46%. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
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3. Empirical Analysis and Results  
Unbalanced panel regression models were used to test the determinants of conventional 
debt and IFIs use among firms. Bevan and Danbolt (2004) argue that the empirical evidence 
on capital structure determinants based on pooled cross-sectional regressions may be biased 
due to their failure to control for firm-specific, time-invariant heterogeneity. A formal 
Hausman specification test for fixed versus random effects panel estimation was used to 
identify the estimation method which is suitable for each financial policy measure.  
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 report the results for conventional debt determinants 
whereby a leverage ratio is used as the dependent variable. The profitability coefficients across 
two different regression models are negative and significant, which are consistent with the 
prediction of pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The shortage of internal funding 
(i.e., profitability) may signal greater uncertainty about a firm’s prospect for solvency, hence 
is likely to attract higher agency cost of equity. Therefore, debt is preferred to minimise the 
agency cost of financing. Debt is also preferred by firms with greater growth opportunities, 
who suffer from greater information asymmetry about their future cash flows. This argument 
is consistent with the observed significant positive relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 report the significance of profitability on firm’s decision 
to use Islamic financing. Both fixed-effect and random-effect models reveal consistent results 
that suggests profitability affects the decision to use IFIs. The negative relation between IFIs 
and firm’s profitability suggests that less profitable firms are more likely to have greater 
proportion of IFIs on their capital structure.  
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4. Conclusions    
The preference for IFIs over conventional debt amongst less profitable firms is 
consistent with the notion that IFIs attract cheaper source of financing due to the ready demand 
created by the restricted Islamic financial market to lend or invest according to Sharia’ 
(Godlewski et al., 2013). Godlewski, et al. (2013) argue that less profitable firms may prioritize 
IFIs over conventional debt financing because the former can be viewed as more accessible 
and advantageous form of financing that attracts lower agency cost of financing in the presence 
of high demand for IFIs from less-diversified Islamic financiers. Also, financing less profitable 
firms may be a second-best solution for Islamic financiers who are under constant need to 
justify their existence and operations by continuously investing in IFIs. While conventional 
financiers would generally turn down less profitable firms, Islamic financiers who suffer an 
adverse selection problem may lend to such firms. It is not impossible for the firms to divert 
funds or have high-cost investment projects that would reduce profitability (Aggarwal and 
Yousef, 2000). This argument suggests that Islamic financiers may have underestimated the 
agency cost of financing, which can be detrimental in the absence of proper risk management. 
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Table 1 Sample distribution by country, data availability, and the use of IFIs (2005-2009) 
 
No. Country 
No. of firms with annual reports 
available (2005-2009)  
No. of firms 
with IFIs 
Percentage (%) 
 
1 Bahrain 3 0 0 
2 Bangladesh 9 0 0 
3 Egypt 9 1 11 
4 Indonesia 16 4 25 
5 Jordan 3 0 0 
6 Kuwait 9 2 22 
7 Malaysia 20 13 65 
8 Mauritius 9 0 0 
9 Pakistan 14 4 29 
10 Palestine 2 0 0 
11 Qatar 16 4 25 
12 Saudi Arabia 6 4 67 
13 Tunisia 1 0 0 
14 UAE 12 4 33 
 Total 129 36 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of variables 
                
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis 
Leverage variables        
Long-term debt / equity 0.85 0.62 0.92 0 5.72 2.40 10.70 
Long-term IFIs / equity 0.28 0.10 0.41 0 1.61 2.00 5.91 
Long-term IFIs / long-term debt 0.46 0.27 1.19 0 1.00 8.74 83.43 
Explanatory variables        
Profitability  0.12 0.11 0.08 -0.15 0.33 -0.21 4.55 
Liquidity  1.76 1.54 0.94 0.17 5.58 1.42 5.72 
Growth opportunities  2.24 1.96 1.54 0.24 8.47 1.74 6.77 
Collateral  0.41 0.47 0.25 0.01 0.90 -0.22 1.96 
Size (ln Sales) 20.36 20.32 1.74 14.92 24.42 -0.33 3.98 
 
 
Table 3 Panel data results of the determinants of the use of debt and IFIs 
           
 
Long-Term Debt  / 
Equity 
 Long-Term IFIs /  
Long-Term Debt 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Explanatory Variables 
Fixed  
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
 Fixed  
Effects 
Random  
Effects 
Profitability  -2.19** -2.43**  -6.35** -6.30*** 
 (-1.97)    (-2.40)     (-2.30)    (-3.73)    
Growth opportunities 0.17*** 0.18***  -0.11 0.05 
 (3.05)    (3.49)     (-0.78)    (0.60)    
Collateral  0.04 0.56  -0.08 0.32 
 (0.05) (1.12)  (-0.04) (0.70) 
Size 0.44*** 0.10  0.09 -0.01 
 (2.69) (1.35)  (0.22) (-0.03) 
Liquidity  0.07 -0.05  -0.41 -0.16 
 (0.57) (-0.49)  (-1.26) (-1.31) 
Constant -8.30** -1.50  0.39 1.27 
 (-2.48)    (-1.00)     (0.05)    (0.91)    
      
Joint test statistic (regression) 3.03** 17.06***  2.82** 21.32*** 
Corr (μi, x) -0.63 0.00  -0.39 0.00 
F-statistic (all μi = 0) 7.98*** -  0.76 - 
Hausman test FE vs RE (χ2) 21.95*** -  4.17 - 
R2 within  0.20 0.13  0.19 0.15 
R2 between 0.02 0.25  0.13 0.26 
R2 overall 0.01 0.15  0.14 0.19 
 
t-statistics in parentheses for fixed effects and z-statistics in parentheses for random effects model. Joint test 
statistic for fixed effects is the F-statistic. Joint test statistic for random effects model is the Wald χ2. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (2-tail test). 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
